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THE SUBTLETY OF POLITICAL RISK WITH FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT: THE CASE OF THE 
VIETNAMESE SUGAR INDUSTRY 
Tom Arnold, University of Richmond 
Bonnie Buchanan, Univusiry of South Carolina & University of Melbourne 
Janice Lo 
Political risk entails more titan a host country rakmg advantage of investment ./i·01n 
foretgn sources. A more subtle form of political risk is wtributuhle to the hos1 gol'emmellt '.s 
mtsmanagement of policies /hat may he tnlended [C) aurae! j(Jreign direct investment. bw may 
have tmintended consequences. .1 pe1:(ect e."'Cample is the ''One t\IJillion Tonne Sugar Program " 
sponsored by the government oj Vietnam during the mid-1990s. What appears to be a vel)' 
!tJcrative investmentfor foretgn m vesrors bec:omes a frnancial disaster due to the inability o,(!he 
govel"nment ro allocate resour·ces efficiently and police irs borders fi·om smugglers. 
T HE NATl!RE OF POLITICAL RISK 
Foreign direct investment in any economy is a risky tmdcrt.1king that is different from 
many other investments- Unlike the purchase of stocks and bonds where contractual obligauons 
protect the rights of investors. a foreign government can potent1ally seize the invcst:rnenl for 
itself, extract additional money for in fTastrucrure improvements not entirely re lated to the 
investment. solicit bribes. or crealt! advantages for domestic participants in the industry. Clark 
( 1997) provides a broad definition of "political risk-'' that captures alI of these aspects of what can 
b~ problematic with tbreign direct investment. Pol it) cal risk is the probability of politica lly 
motivated changes (either explicit or ongoing change) that affect the outcome of foreign direct 
investment. 
Consequently, in addit'ion to the risk nomJally associated wirh the mvestmcnt, the 
governmental structure and the cx tsttng legal system of the host country are a matter of concern. 
Many countries that desire foreign dtrcct investment struggle Wilh these specific issues. further, 
it is not only an issue of mak1ng <.:hanges in the existmg governmental/legal systems, but also an 
issue of determining whether the changes are credible. The "One Milhon Tonne Sugar Program" 
in Viemam during the mid-l990s provtdes an instance in which a number of these factors can be 
examined concurrently 1• 
The success/failure of the venture hmges on a government program to stop the 
importation of sugar into Vietnam and to make Vietnam a sugar exporter. The specific goal is to 
develop a sugar industry within V tetnam capable of producing one million tonnes of refined 
sugar by the year 2000. To make sugar production efficient, large mills are needed w1tb nearby 
lands dedicated to the growing of sugarcane. Although the production of one million tonnes is 
met by :WOO. rhe sugar industry was far from efficient or profitable. 
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SliGAR PRODUCTION AND THE ONE MILLIO:\f TONNE SUGAR PROGUAM 2 
To produce sugar efficien tl y requires econom1cs of scale_ The sugax mills must be large 
(crushing capacity of 350,000 tonncs nfsugarcane) and the sugarcane must be "crushed'' with as 
liLtle delay as possible af1er being harvested to prevent sugar content loss. The solution for tllC 
latter ·issue is to sin1ply have the sugarcane grown in an area Very close to the milL Th1s prevents 
sugar content loss and reduces tmnsportation costs. As to building large sugar mills, a licensure 
procedure that prevents the building of small inefficient mllls msures the best u,se of resources. 
The mtention of the One Million Tonne Sugar Program was to build large mllls 
lhroLighout the country in economically poor areas. The government woultl provide 
tnfrastrucrure improvements and seek contracts from fanners to grow the sugarcane for specific 
mills. While the industry developed. protective import tariffs (as high as 70% above the wodd 
price of sugar) and quotas we.rc imposed to create a domcsric market for the new mills . 
Evenntally, the mills would produce enough sugar to supply the cotJntry and allow for the export 
of sugar (about 10%) to 25% of the output would sell on the world market, Saigon fimes Daily 
8/911 999). 
The mms were to be funded though loans indirectly from the government through state 
owned banks and through foreign direct investment. The benefit of the bank loans was that the 
state oftc:n forgave or refinanced loans in times t)f crisis. The disadvantage of bank loans was 
that government financing required semi-annl!al mspections in which bnbes were often 
solicired.1 Consequently, a joint venture with the govcmment or having all funding provided by 
a foreign source carry (possibly offsctrmg) advantages and disadvantages. 
Prelim1nary feasibility proposab fo r building new sugar mills were to be evaluated by the 
Ministty of Agricultural and Rura.l Development (MARD ). Mills requiring investments over I 00 
billion Vietnamese dong tappro;dmately 9 million U. S. dollars) need further approval by the 
Ministry of Planning and lnvestment, the Min istry of Finance. and cvcnn1ally by the Pritne 
Minister. As a result1 smtlller mills had fewer requirements for approval creating an incentive to 
not build large mills. 
Overall. the incentives for building a sugarf'lilltn Vietnam during the late 1990s are very 
compelling: 
• A contracted constant supply ofsugartune. 
• Extension programs (primarily pc:rfonneJ by large mills) to tn<:reasc the sugar 
content of the sugarcane-
• lrnprovt:d infra-stn1cture for the transpon.auon of sugarcane ti·om the l'iclds 
• A restrictive tariff t}Hd makes doml!stic sugar prices inflated and quotas 10 restrict 
imported sugar 
• Potential for loans from govcmment backed banks 
'vVilh all or the government initiatives in place. the main decision for an mvcs tor is t·o determine 
the size of the sugar mill ro be built. 
An NPV analysis for a sugar mill that calil cn1sh .'500,000 ronnes annually (bas~d on 
indt1stry standards from other sugar producing countric~) Is displayed in Exhibit I 
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The analysis considers the eventual removal of the restricti ve tanff. The d1scount rate of 
l 0% produces an NPV tbat is positive with an internal rate of return of I 0.93%. The funding of 
the project assumes no state sponsored funding despite ns possible benefits. Based on the 
analysis, the project IS deemed acceptable and this is the same conclusion that many foreign and 
domestic investors reached. Consequently, a number of new sugar mills were built during this 
period. 
THE RESULTS OF THE ONE :VULLION TONNE SliGAR PROGRAM 
By 2000, the program meets the one million tonne productioo goal with the emergence 
of 33 new sugar mills throughout the country in a five year period (44 mil'l s total). The growing 
area ror sugarcane wcreases from 150,000 hectares to 350.000 hectares4. Although larger mi lls 
are preferred due to economtcs of sca le, most of the new mills arc small bt:cause the approval 
process is much quicker {28 of 44: crushing capacity of less than 150,000 tonnes annually). Nine 
medium size mills (crushmg capacity of 150.000 to 350.000 tonnes annually) and six large mills 
(crushing capacity in excess of 350,000 tonncs. 3 jomt ventures between fore1gn investors and 
local govemments and 3 complete ly owned by foreign investors) comprise tbe rest of the 
industry. Except for the large mills. most of the mills are owned by local governments or the 
central government. 
The fir::>t difficulty faced by the .sugar industry in Vietnam was that sugar prices plunged 
(see F1gure I) io the late 1990s. 
The higb import tari ff and the ability to smuggle sugar over Vietnam's large ~order 
(approximately 3,000 kilometers or I ,864 miles) created massive stockpiles of domestic sugar as 
smuggling commenced (Mai, the Vie tnam Investment Review, 5/4/1 999; see Exhibit 2 for 
smuggling c timates). 
A cycle began to develop JO which the high domestic !;Ugar prices encouraged smuggling, 
creating f;to~kpilcs of domesti c sugar (160,000 tonnes report by Asia Pulse ll/26/1999, 280,000 
tonnes reported by The Vietnam Investment Review 4/29/2002: the local market consumes 
rough ly 750,000 tonncs of sugar annually). With ~arge stockpiles of sugar. mill s reduced output 
leaving fanners wi tb sugarcane tbat they could not sell (one report of 500,000 tonnes of tmso1d 
sugarcane appears in Asia Pulse 3/ 14/2000). Stockpiles also created enough of an incentive for 
fanners nut to grow sugarcane tor fear of not being able to sell the sugarcane io the future (a 
reduction of 30.000 hectares of fannland dl!voted to sugarcane is reported by The Vietnam 
Investment Review 3/5/1001 for the 2000-200 I growing season). The cycle completed with 
sugarcane shortages that allowed mills to only run at 70% capacity (Tbe Vietnam Investment 
Review 4/ 1/2002). 
Economic difficulties witlun o.n indust1y are risks assessed pnor Lo investment and failu re 
is certainly oot necessari ly the fault of the host government. However. poor implementation of 
the program exacerbates the economic difficulties. First, the approval of small to mediUJn-sizc 
mef[jcientmills (rougbly 60% of tbe overall production of sugar) funded by government sources 
burts lhe larger mills. The inefficient mills extract va luable resources and have no incentive to 
be efficient because tbe government will more than likely torgivc/restructure debt (see Ce-ntre for 
lntematiooal Economics report prepared tor the World Bank (200 1)). 
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Second, the government does not fttltill its obligations in regard to infrastrucrurc 
Improvements and contrac ting whh farmers to grow sugarcane. Only 15% to 20% of the funds 
required for infrastructure improvements (primarily for building roads) arc rea lized 
Approximately 42% of the farmland designated for grow1ng sugarcane is outside the original 
specified boundaries creating significantly higher transportation costs and more loss of sugar 
content within the harvested sugarcane. Furthermore, tncidents of farmers selling s ugarcane to a 
purchaser other than the designated mill occur (e.g. see Mai, The Vietnam Investment Review 
7/ 1 5/2002). 
E>. hihir 2 
Sug<tr Smu~gt ing Estim otl' 
Media Source: Date: Estimate: 
Dow Jones Newswires I J/24/1999 300,000 tonnes in 1999 
Asia Pulse· 1 1/26/ 1999 150.000 tonnes annuaUy 
Vietnam Investment Review 4/29/2002 I ,000 tonnes daily 
Vtetnam 1nvestment Revsew 1/06/2003 200,000 tonncs in 2002 
Vietnam Investment Review 2/ 10/2003 l 00,000- 200,000 tonnes annually 
'Number confirmed ny the Menistry of Agriculture and Rural Deveh>pment lMARD) 
Third, a protective tari ff without the ability to secure borders results in sugar smuggling 
into Vietnam. Even if the borders are secured, the tarlfT does not encourage mills to become 
efficient and competitive. Al though the reduction.of the tariff is considered in the NPV analysis 
seen earlier. the assumpt ion of the mill achteving fu ll capacity after two years is effectively 
thwa11ed by the inabitiry Lo obtain sugarcane due to reasons djscusscd in the previous two 
paragraphs. By 2002. many foreign investors \Vere attempting to liquidate their investments or 
leave JOint ventures aJtogcthcr (Mai , The Vietnam Investment Review 7 I 1512002). 
ASSESSL~G POLITICAL RISK 
What emerges from tbis cas~ study is that polit ical risk is more Umn a host country taking 
advantage of investmcot from forcJgn sources. Certainly, the host country's government can 
enact legislation that is specifically detrimental to foreign investors, but that is not the case with 
the sugar program in Vie tnam. The Vietnamese govcrnrncnt is unable to commission sugar mills 
of the appropriate size, contract fam1ers to grow sugarcane in the pre-specified regions, and 
provide appropriate infrastrucru rc improvements. TI1cse are fail ings of lhc government 
implementing the sugar program and not direct legislation to extort mone-y from fore ign 
investors, 
14 
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A second layer of risk emerges by Lhc Cl'eation of policies that allow inefficient non-
competitive sugar mills to be built and maintained. Because the state owned banks consiStently 
forgive lmms or restructure loans, rhe incentive for mills to be efficient by design or to ·strive for 
efficiency is lost. This is compounded by the import tariff that al so thwans compettlive 
lucentives to become efficient. Even if the government approves inefticient sugar mills. if left 
ummpeded, market forces will force the ineffi cient mills to cease operations. Because policies 
prevent the market to dictate efficiency, the small to medium size mills extract valuable 
resources from mill s that have the capacity to be efficient. 
A th1rd layer of risk is the mability of Vicrnam· s legal system to patrol and punish sugar 
-Slll\lggling, The restrictive tariff was intended ro protect the domestic sugar industry until it 
became viable. Unfortunately, because the Vietnamese border is so expansive, the tariff created 
an incentive for srnuggl ing on a large scale. Numerous attempts to catch smuggling or 10 pUrttsh 
the usc of smuggled sugor failed. 
CONCLUSION 
Jt is difficult to determine whether or not the sugar program would have been profitable 
for forei gn investors. assuming sugar prices had not crashed during the late 1990s. After the 
introduct ion of the 1987 Foreign Direct Investment Act, Vietnam had been more productive and 
by many standards looked attractive for foreign direct investment (see figures in Appendix One). 
Crashing sugar prices are part of tbc risk or investment no matter where sugar mills are located. 
However. the creation and perpetuation of non-competitive sugar mills wo uld sti ll be a 
factor because their existence prevents resources from being allocated to larger more efficient 
mills. Further. the restrictive tari !T may still have ~ncouraged sugar smuggling due to the 
i:uability to patrol the border. Ultimately, the political risk of investing in the sugar industry 10 
Vietnan.l is due tO several factors: tbe inabd tty of the government to implement the stated 
objccnves of the One Million Tonne Sugar Program, a banking/polrtical structure that 
implements and maintains inefficiency, and an inabiliry to patrol a large border to prevent 
smuggling. 
NOTES 
A tonne refers to a metric ton which is equivalent to 2.204.62 pounds or I I 02 U. S, rons . 
., Except when otherwise specified, the background infonnation provtded for this paper is from 
a December. 100 I World Batlk report by the Centre for International Econontic-.s entitled: 
Vietnam S1tgur P~·ogram. Whare NexrY 
3. See Economist Intell igence Unit Country Report on Vietnam for October1 2001. page I () , 
4. A hectare is 2.47 acres 
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The Vietnam ln1 ·estme1JI Rf!Vf{!v,: ( 1 16/2003), Sugar industry finds the gomg bitter. sccl-"S hc-lp. 
ThP Vi<"fT'fOm /twestmr:n/ Rt-view (21 1 0/2003 ). Subsidy sweetener for sugar tndusrry. 
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APPE:'-IOIX 
Foreign Direct Investment Statistics for \'ictnam 
Figure 1.-\. :\ umber of Foreign Direct lnV(:s tm cnt Projects (1988 - 1997) 
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Figure 2A. Foreign Direct Investment Capital (1988 - 1997) 
FDI Capital in Vietnam (1988-1 997) 
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Source: Economic Development Review (I 998) 
Registered capital is the minimum value of committed capital nominated by foreign !inns that 
receive a licence. 
Realized capital is the amount foreign invested firms actually spend. 
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Figure JA. Leading Investors (by Coun try) in Vietna m (:~ umber of Proj t'cts) 
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Figure -&A. Leading Investors (by Countr~) in Vietnam (liS$) 
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